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Summary in Swedish 
De kollektiva löneförhandlingarna i Sverige har från och med andra hälf-
ten av 1990-talet påverkats av en informell samordning mellan stora 
fackförbund och förhandlingsorganisationer. Parterna har utgått från en 
tågordning där industrins förhandlingsresultat sätter en norm för avtals-
ökningarna i den övriga ekonomin. Denna uppsats presenterar en teore-
tisk analys av en sådan förhandlingsordning. Två teoretiska tolkningar av 
det svenska förhandlingssystemet presenteras: (i) Industrin som en 
Stackelberg-ledare och (ii) industrins avtalsökning som en norm som 
understöds av antingen ett socialt tryck eller "avundsjuka" fackförbund 
inom tjänstesektorn. Analysens centrala slutsats är att lönenormering 
avsevärt kan förbättra såväl produktions- som sysselsättningsnivå jämfört 
med fallet utan normering. Genom att generalisera en idé som presente-
rats av Lars Calmfors och Anna Larsson härleds också en enkel teori om 
varför normen ibland förefaller binda och ibland inte. En jämförelse av 
modellens prediktioner med avtalsutfallen från de fem senaste avtalsrö-
relserna visar att modellen i allmänhet är konsistent med empiriska ob-
servationer: avtalsökningarna är mer återhållsamma och lönenormen 








From the mid-1990s onwards, Swedish wage bargaining has been characterised by infor-
mal co-ordination of the wage claims of big unions and bargaining cartels. In particular, it has
been understood that the manufacturing sector should lead by ﬁrst agreeing on a pay increase,
whereafter the service sector and public sector unions choose a similar increase. We analyse this
setup with two possible theoretical interpretations: (i) the manufacturing sector as a Stackelberg
leader and (ii) a normative role for the manufacturing sector’s pay increase, supported either by
unmodelled social pressure or a modeled loss aversion (envy) of the sheltered sector unions. The
conclusion of the analysis is that the normative or leading role of one sector – in the Swedish
case the manufacturing sector – can potentially bring big beneﬁts for employment and output.
Generalising an idea suggested by Lars Calmfors and Anna Larsson, our analysis also generates
a rudimentary theory of why the wage increase norm sometimes binds and sometimes not. A
comparison of the model predictions and the observed outcomes of the last ﬁve wage bargaining
rounds in Sweden suggests that the model is generally consistent with the empirical observa-
tions: wage moderation and norm observance are stronger when the manufacturing industry’s
initial relative wage is low.
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Since the demise of the formally centralised wage bargaining procedures in the 1980s, Swedish
labour market parties have gradually settled on a system of informal co-ordination. This new bar-
gaining procedure is not completely well-deﬁned, nor accepted by everybody. Yet it is possible to
enumerate a few principles and stylised facts that characterise the current institutions:
• The pay increases of most wage earners are still directly or indirectly steered by the collective
agreements negotiated by the unions. Centralised, i.e. nationwide union or business federa-
tions have no formal role or mandate in wage bargaining. However, they have been replaced
by large bargaining cartels and co-ordination between unions and between employer organi-
sations. These bargaining cartels transcend the blue-collar vs. white-collar demarcation line.
Instead, they encompass the wage-earners of the manufacturing (mostly) export sector, the
public sector or groupings of service sector unions.
• From the late 1990s onwards, it has been generally accepted that the manufacturing industry
should play a leading role in pay bargaining. Thus, it is expected that the manufacturing
sector organisations are the ﬁrst to conclude a new collective agreement, and, furthermore, that
the remaining bargainers will adopt that level of pay increases in their own pay settlements.
This leading role of the manufacturing industry partners is often called “pay increase norm”
(lönenormering) in Sweden.
• The leading role of the manufacturing sector is reﬂected in the organisational structures of the
labour market. On the union side, there is an effective organisation, “Manufacturing Unions”
(Facken inom Industrin) that establishes a common pay claim for almost the entire manufac-
turing sector.1
• Along with the manufacturing industry cartel, the workers’ central organisation LO continues
to enforce and sustain the co-ordination efforts of its member unions, even if it is formally
cut off from pay bargaining. Employers probably also try to co-ordinate their bargaining
efforts within the Swedish Business Confederation (Svenskt Näringsliv). Such organisational
co-ordination overlaps with the sectoral bargaining cartels.
• Even if formal centralisation is rejected by all parties, many institutional features support
informal co-ordination. Most wage settlements are synchronised, so that bargains occur in the
same year, although not simultaneously. The collective agreements of most wage-earners are
set for a period of three years. A new government authority, the National Mediation Ofﬁce,
has also been established, with the explicit task of facilitating a common understanding of the
“room” for pay increases, ahead of each pay bargaining round. Another government authority,
1This co-operation transcends the traditional demarcation line between hourly paid workers and salaried employees.
The manufacturing sector unions and their employers counterparts have also established a network of contacts and agree-
ments on bargaining routines. This co-operation was started in 1997, when the labour market organisations representing
manufacturing industry forged an agreement (Industriavtalet) on improving bargaining procedures and basing the pay
increases on a shared analysis of macroeconomic conditions and productivity growth.
7the National Institute of Economic Research, is charged with the responsibility to publish a
yearly report on the preconditions for wage increases.
Inthelast10years, paybargaininghasbeenconductedmoreorlessaccordingtotheseprinciples.
When wage contracts are about to expire, the manufacturing sector unions get together and forge an
agreement on the proper pace of pay increases. That settlement is then taken as a normative starting
point for the other big bargaining cartels, the service sector and public sector ones. Thus, casual
observation suggests that informal pay bargaining co-ordination has indeed increased. This period
of at least seemingly strengthening co-ordination has coincided with a relatively benign outcome in
the labour market. The pace of nominal pay increases has decreased, and the unemployment rate has
also been decreasing, at least up to the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008–2009.
2 Wage increase norms: possible economic interpretations
After the contribution of Calmfors and Drifﬁll (1988), the effects of centralised and decentralised
pay bargaining setups have been widely analysed and discussed. Yet it is not clear how the new
Swedish bargaining setup should be interpreted in terms of economic theory. The theory literature on
wage bargaining usually looks at three well deﬁned bargaining “levels” (ﬁrm, union, economywide),
whereas the Swedish system clearly looks like something else.
At least three possible interpretations stand out.
1. The new bargaining setup contains so many co-ordinating elements that it might just be inter-
preted as centralisation under a new guise. The pay increase norm procedure and the compli-
cated co-ordination process facilitated by the National Mediation Ofﬁce could just be a way
of implementing centralisation without really saying so. This interpretation is not completely
without merit. There are now many new co-ordinating mechanisms in place. The new Na-
tional Mediation Ofﬁce facilitates discussions between all main labour market organisations.
It is also generally agreed that a jointly agreed economywide (average) level of pay increases
should be an important starting point even for the bargains of single unions. Against this inter-
pretation it could be said, however, that nobody in Sweden seems explicitly to acknowledge it
– and centralised wage formation is emphatically rejected as a solution of principle.
2. Another interpretation is that the parties now play a leader – follower (Stackelberg) game in
which one player (the open (“traded”) sector cartel) leads by ﬁrst selecting its pay increase,
whereafter the service sector cartels optimise their own pay increase, taking the traded sector
pay settlement as given. This interpretation seems in sync with the labour market parties’
stated objectives and rules of the game. The manufacturing industry bargaining cartel empha-
sises its “leading role” for each bargaining round. Service sector and public sector unions, in
turn, have widely acknowledged that marching order. Furthermore, it has been the case dur-
ing the last four bargaining rounds (1998, 2001, 2004, and 2007) that the big manufacturing
industry organisations have ﬁrst committed themselves to a level of pay increases. Against
8this interpretation, however, it should be said that a leader-follower game normally presup-
poses that the follower is completely free to choose its action once the leader has chosen his.
In Swedish pay bargaining, however, it has also been a common understanding that the pay
increase selected by the manufacturing industry partners should serve as a normative starting
point for the service sector and public sector bargainers2.
3. If we take seriously the idea of the manufacturing sector setting a binding norm for every-
body else’s pay increase, a third natural interpretation would be that the parties in fact have
committed themselves to some appropriate relative wage between the different sectors of the
economy. This interpretation is vindicated by the observation that the wage bargaining norm
is always stated as a percentual increase and never as some level of pay. In other words, the
common understanding is that the industry partners ﬁrst agree on a “room” for pay increases,
expressed in percentual terms, and that the other bargainers then take that increase as their
norm3. If followed to the letter, that would of course imply an unchanged relative wage be-
tween the sectors, so that the implicit understanding is about some unchanged relative wage (in
fact a real exchange rate, if we interpret the manufacturing sector – service sector distinction
in terms of the tradables – nontradables theory).
All three interpretations have some merit. The ﬁrst interpretation, outright centralisation, has
been extensively analysed in labour economics. In this paper, we shall focus on the two other
interpretations to shed light on current Swedish pay bargaining institutions.
To assess wage bargaining frameworks, we need a theoretical framework that incorporates the
relevant externalities that wage setters must take into account. The motivation for analysing wage
bargaining institutions stems from the fact that the incentives of large unions are not compatible
with an efﬁcient economic outcome. Unions tend to claim wages that are too high, mainly because
they can to some extent pass on the costs of doing so on other agents of the economy. In particular,
two channels have been thoroughly investigated in the literature. Firstly, unions in many sectors can
affect the prices of their sector by increasing their wages. In that way, they can pass the cost of their
wages to consumers and even workers of other sectors, whose room for pay increases diminishes.
This is probably the most important externality investigated in the literature on bargaining systems.
It was the main mechanism analysed by Calmfors and Drifﬁll (1988) in their celebrated contribution
and further analysed by Soskice (1990). Secondly, the pay claims of unions increase unemployment,
but the costs of unemployment are not entirely borne by the members of the union. Instead, they are
partly borne by taxpayers.
In this paper, we focus on the former mechanism, namely the incentive of a big union to raise
wages and thereby affect relative prices.
2Thishasbeen acknowledged intheprocedural framework agreements ofthelabourmarketpartiesinmany othersec-
tors. For example, the Bargaining Protocol of the Municipal Workers (Förhandlingsprotokoll 2000-05-04, Förhandlingar
om Kommunal Avtal om Förhandlingsordning) states that “The internationally competing sector has a norm-setting role,
so that, when possible, the negotiations of the internationally competing sector should be concluded ﬁrst, wherever wage
negotiations overlap in time.”(translation by the author).
3A partial exception to this is provided by the blue-collar federation LO’s insistence on even providing minimum pay
increases deﬁned in krones, not as percentages.
93 A model framework
We adopt a two-player wage bargaining framework, earlier used by Holden (2003) and Vartiainen
(2002), as well as, more recently, by Larsson (2007). Consider an economy with two goods: a
tradable T-good and a nontradeable S-good (following the terminology of Vartiainen (2002), S for
“sheltered” and T for “traded”). Suppose that the economy’s labour force is organised in two bar-
gaining cartels (unions), indexed by S and T. This is a simpliﬁcation of reality, but, for the case
of Sweden, where there is big manufacturing bargaining cartel faced with large service sector and
public sector unions, the simpliﬁcation is perhaps not too unrealistic.








where Wi is sector i nominal wage, pi is the sector i product price, P = P(pS,pT) is the consumer
price index, Li(Wi/pi) is employment in sector i andWr is the money income of an unemployed per-
son. Thus, the cartel maximises the money surplus of members’ incomes in excess of the guaranteed
income Wr. The latter can be interpreted as the monetary value of an (unmodelled) unemployment
beneﬁt, a low-paid service sector job in the black economy or the value of inefﬁcient home produc-
tion (growing carrots in the backyard)4.
Assuming that the cartels can freely set the wage that corresponds to the solution of the optimi-
sation problem, it can be shown by differentiating (1) (see Rama (1994) and Vartiainen (2002) for








in which the expressions exy denote the elasticity of variable x with respect to variable y and wr =
Wr/P (we use lowercase letters to denote real variables). Equation (2) illustrates the ﬁrst-principle
tradeoffs that a utilitarian union is interested in: (i) its preferred wage depends on the elasticity of
employment with respect to the nominal wage it sets, eLiWi, and (ii) the effect of its wage on the
members’ purchasing power via the aggregate price index, as captured by the elasticity ePWi.
In the paper at hand, we assume that the central bank has a credible inﬂation target and is able
to enforce it completely. Thus, we can set the consumer price index P to unity, so that ePWi = 0 and
real and nominal magnitudes coincide:
P(pS,pT) = 1. (3)
All the “action” now concerns the cartels’ ability to affect their relative price, given an overall price
level. Let us deﬁne the real product wages ni = Wi/pi and decompose the employment – money
4The objective function (1) is very simple: the cartels maximise a wage sum surplus. This implies, inter alia, that
increasing the number of a sector’s unemployed individuals does not affect the chosen wage. By the same token, we can
in principle assume free mobility between the sectors, so that the expected utilities of workers are equalised, and this does
not affect the solution either. Such simple utilitarian models are often used in the theory of union wage determination,
but their limitations should be kept in mind.
10wage elasticity according to
eLiWi = eLini(1−epiWi). (4)
The last expression shows that the labour demand elasticity with respect to the “own” nominal wage
is a product of the employment elasticity with respect to the real product wage, multiplied by a term
that measures the sector’s ability to affect its own product price. The former quantity eLini only











which shows the relevant interplay of the bargaining cartels in this model. The (inverse) ratio of
a cartel’s wage to the “competitive” low income Wr depends both on the technical labour demand
elasticity eLini (that only depends on the production function) and the cartel’s ability to affect its own
product price by increasing its nominal wage, captured by epiWi. If eLini is high in absolute terms,
labour demand is elastic with respect to the product wage. The second term in (5) is then near zero
and the preferred wage is near wr. If the price-inﬂuencing power of the cartel is large, then epiWi > 0
is large, and the second term in (5) is large, so that the preferred wage exceeds wr by a wide margin.
The elasticities epiWi depend on the entire structure of the economy, i.e. preferences and tech-
nology. Let us trade away some generality and assume that both sectors are characterised by a
Cobb-Douglas production function with the same capital-labour share d:
Yi = Fi(Li) = AiLd
i , (6)
where Ai reﬂects technology and the size of the capital stock which is assumed to be ﬁxed. This
assumption is of course restrictive but it simpliﬁes the algebra considerably5. Furthermore, we
assume that the wage share is at least 1/2.6
d ≥ 1/2. (7)
In order to close the model, we must specify preferences and technology. Suppose that consumer










where xT and xS are the consumed levels of the two goods and the hi are positive weights that sum
to unity. Parameter s is the elasticity of substition between the goods. The ideal price index is then
5Numerical experiments suggest that the qualitative results of the paper would not be signiﬁcantly affected by allow-
ing for different capital intensities.
6The cartels’ objectives are linear in real income, and the elasticity of employment with respect to the real product
wage depends on the wage share parameter d. If that parameter is too low, employment is inelastic, which would enable
the union to increase the wage bill indeﬁnitely by increasing the wage.





To close the model, we assume simply that all factor incomes are consumed and equate the
supply of either good to the demand of the same good. Implicitly we assume that the economy runs




Once the cartels have chosen their wages, the model is closed.
4 Algebraic analysis of the model
4.1 Preliminaries
The Nash equilibrium of the model cannot be solved analytically except for the special cases in
which either the elasticity of substitution s is unity or the sectors are otherwise symmetrical so that
hS = hT and AS = AT. However, the results of Vartiainen (2002) imply that there is a unique Nash
equilibrium.
Some wage levels serve as benchmarks that turn up in the algebra of the model. The alter-
native wage Wr was assumed to represent the value of not working. We call this wage level the
competitive wage, since this is the wage level where the economy would converge with mobility
of interchangeable workers, completely ﬂexible wages and no disutility of working in excess of the
eventual disutility associated with Wr.
If a cartel could not at all inﬂuence the price of its own product, so that epiWi = 0 holds, it only





We call this wage Wr/d the autonomous wage since it reﬂects the absence of any attempt to affect
the economy’s relative prices.










Finally, note that the exponential production functions (6) imply that
7This is not a loss of generality as long as one can assume that the pay claims of the unions do not affect the
country’s external position. In other words, we implicitly assume that the average propensity to save is not affected by





The key magnitudes of the model are the elasticities epTWT and epSWS which turn up in the cartels’
optimal unilateral solution (5) and which capture the cartels’ price inﬂuencing power and thereby
their strategic interaction. We can relate these elasticities to the other endogenous variables of the
model by totally differentiating the price level objective (3) (with equation (9) substituted in) and the




















The assumption dS = dT implies that the goods market equilibrium (10) generates an onto mapping


















is a positive constant. Equation (17) implies that WS/WT determines the relative price pS/pT. Ex-
pressions (15) and (16) then determine the elasticities epSWT and epSWS. This is illustrated in Figure 1,
drawn in the WS – WT action space. For each straight line emanating from the origin, the elasticities
epSWT and epSWS are constant and the relative price pS/pT is constant9.
Whether the elasticity of substitution s is high or low is important for the strategic interaction
of the two parties and hence the conclusions of the model. Below, we show that whether s exceeds
unity or not determines the slope of the parties’ reaction curves in their bilateral game. Intuition
suggests that if s is high, the cartels’ market power is curtailed, since the consumer can then easily
substitute one good for the other, so that a cartel’s excessive wage claim leads to a shift in the
consumption basket and hence unemployment. Conversely, if s is low, the cartels have a lot of
market power and can simply increase their incomes by charging more for their labour services.
This intuition is readily conﬁrmed if we analyse the ﬁrst order conditions of the cartels’ optimisation
problem and the resulting Nash equilibrium of the model. Expressions (15) and (16) imply that
8To get these results, we use the fact that the Cobb-Douglas production functions in (6) imply that production in each
sector i is a function Qi(Wi/pi) = Fi(Li(Wi/pi)) of the real product wage. The expression Q′
i/Qi that turns up in the
differentiated goods market equilibrium can then be equated to −gi(pi/Wi).
9If we had allowed for different factor shares dS  = dT, the iso-elasticity loci would be nonlinear.








Thus, the sum of the own-price elasticities is bound by a term that depends on the substitution
elasticity. Recall that, according to (5), the cartels’ preferred wages are increasing functions of their
own pricing power epiWi.
Consider the case of perfect symmetry in which the production functions are the same (AS =AT)
and hS = hT = 1/2. The highest pay claims occur when there is no substitutability at all, so that
s = 0 and the consumption function is of the Leontief type. Then equation (19) and symmetry
imply that epiWi = 1/2 so thatWi =Wr/(2d −1). This is the highest possible wage in the symmetric
case. If the wage share approaches 0.5, the desired wage approaches inﬁnity. If, on the other hand,
s = ¥, substitutability is perfect, and epiWi = 0 because of (19). Then the unions will choose the
autonomous wage Wr/d, which is the lowest possible wage supported by Nash equilibrium in the
symmetry case: with perfect substitutability, the cartels have no pricing power.
4.2 Reaction functions, Nash equilibrium versus efﬁcient solutions
The conventional analysis of Nash equilibrium and the efﬁcient locus is summarised in Figure 2. The
model equations imply that the cartels have well-deﬁned reaction functions, which may be drawn
as shown in Figure 2 for the case s ≤ 1. The Nash equilibrium is found at the intersection of the
reaction curves. The reaction curves are deﬁned by the preference mapping induced by the cartels’
14objective function (1). The indifference curves are deﬁned by conditions Ui = constant, and the
reaction curves are the loci of points where the indifference curves are horisontal for the S-cartel
and vertical for the T-cartel. In Vartiainen (2002), it was shown that this model always has a unique
Nash equilibrium10.




















We can derive closed form expressions for the inverses of the reaction functions. Let the best
wage response of the T-sector cartel to a given S-sector wage WS be given by the function WT =
RT(WS). The best response function of the T-sector is solved by using (5), in which we have sub-
stituted equations (14), (15), (16), (17) and (18). After some manipulations, we can explicitly solve




























The function B(WT) is bounded in each cartel’s action space [Wr/d,¥). It is zero at the lowest
possible wage WT = Wr/d and then increases monotonically towards a ﬁnite limit of d/M. The
10This result did not require dS = dT.
15inverse reaction function can be used to derive the reaction elasticity eWTWS, that is, the relative










This elasticity embodies the properties of the reaction function: it is positive if s is below unity,
and, as expected, it is zero if s = 1, which is the Cobb-Douglas consumer preferences case with
horizontal reaction functions. The expression for the elasticity eWSWT, capturing the effect of the
T-sector wage on the S-sector wage along the S-sector reaction curve, is analogous.
That the reaction curves slope upwards when s < 1 can also be explained as follows. Consider
the T-sector’s reaction curve in WT – WS -space as depicted in Figure 3. Assume that point A is
on the reaction curve, so that it represents the T-cartel’s best response to the S-cartel’s wage. With
that point A is associated some speciﬁc level of the relative wage WT/WS, represented by the slope
of the ray emanating from the origin and passing through A. Consider now some other wage ratio
associated with a higher value of the own-price-wage elasticity epTWT. If s is below unity, a higher
elasticity epTWT is associated with a lower (WT/WS)-ratio (see equations (15), (16) and (17)). Hence,
because of (5), a lower (WT/WS)-ratio is associated with a higher best response wage WT. Hence,
point B must be on a lower ray from the origin but must have higher WT than point A. This is only
possible if the T-sector’s reaction curve slopes upwards, as is apparent from Figure 3. An analogous
argument applies when s > 1, in which case a lower (WT/WS)-ratio implies a lower epTWT.







These results can be summarised as follows:
16Result 1. If the elasticity of substitution s is below unity, the cartels’ actions are strategic com-
plements and the reaction curves slope upwards as in Figure 2. If s is above unity, the cartels are
strategic substitutes to each other and the reaction curves slope downwards. If s is unity, the reaction
curves are constants (horizontal and vertical), so that a cartel’s preferred wage is independent of the
other cartel’s wage.
We use the s <1 case as a benchmark, for two reasons. Firstly, one would think that manufactur-
ing industry goods and service sector goods cannot easily be substituted for each other11. Secondly,
it seems more plausible that the reaction curves slope upwards: if one cartel increases its wage, most
observers seem to expect a higher wage claim from other trade unions, too.
There is a locus of efﬁcient solutions in which both nominal wages are lower than at the Nash
solution. Along that locus, the indifference curves of both sectors have the same slope. That locus is
also depicted in Figure 2. The points of the efﬁcient outcomes are found as the solution to a problem
of maximising an objective function that is a weighted sum of their individual objective functions. It
is also well known that the parties can attain such an efﬁcient outcome if they bargain on the entire
vector of wages (WT,WS). If the cartels were to conduct a Nash bargain on the entire vector of wages
(WT,WS), with the Nash equilibrium as a natural threat point, they would agree on on some point on
the efﬁcient curve. This becomes evident if maximises the Nash product
{UT(WT,WS)−UT(Nash)}×{US(WT,WS)−US(Nash)}, (25)
subject to the goods market equilibrium and price restrictions. The resulting ﬁrst order condition is
then equivalent to the solution of the weighted maximisation problem.
We can derive an analytic expression for the efﬁcient solution curve. Setting the parties objective
functions equal to some constant and differentiating (and taking of course into account equations
(10) and (3)) yields expressions for the slope of the cartels’ indifference curves. Equating them
yields, after some manipulations, the condition
tT[epTWT −d]+tS[epSWS −d] = −(1−d). (26)
This deﬁnes the efﬁcient contract locus. For each relative wage WT/WS there is only one pair of
wages that simultaneously satisﬁes both (26) and the goods market equilibrium (10). Inspection of
(26) conﬁrms the intuition that an efﬁcient solution requires lower wages than the Nash equilibrium.
We can get some more information on the position of the efﬁcient curve by substituting one
cartel’s wage in (26) with the competitive wage Wr. In other words, if the T-sector, say, chooses
WT =Wr, so that tT = 0, contract efﬁciency according to equation (26) requires tS = (1−d)/(d −
epSWS). The latter condition, however, is the same as the ﬁrst order condition (5) that deﬁnes the
11One may speculate that the formation of trade unions may in fact be related to the grouping of goods in such a
way that workers organise themselves within industries whose goods are not easily substituted by other goods. There
would be no point in organising a union around the production of a good that is completely substitutable by another
good produced in a non-unionised industry. Soskice (1990) emphasizes that the Calmfors-Drifﬁll-type results hinge on
the fact that it is easier for the consumer to substitute between goods of the same industry (two motor cars, say) than
between the goods of different industries (a motor car for a haircut, say).









S-sector reaction curve. Thus, we know that the efﬁcient locus joins the reaction curves at the level
Wi =Wr, as we have depicted them in Figure 2.
If one believes that the Swedish bargaining setup in fact represents complete co-ordination in
disguise (our ﬁrst interpretation in 2), then the Swedish outcome may be some point on the efﬁcient
curve.
4.3 The wage norm as a leader-follower outcome
Our second interpretation of the Swedish bargaining regime, a leader – follower game, can with the
presented model naturally be interpreted as a Stackelberg equilibrium in which the T-sector ﬁrst
selects its wage and the S-sector then optimises its wage claim, taking as given the choice of the
T-sector. This outcome is illustrated in Figure 4. The T-sector cartel knows that the S-sector will
pick a wage level from its own reaction curve. The T-cartel will then select a point from the S-sector
reaction curve and choose the point which touches the most advantageous T-sector indifference
curve (see Figure 4).
We see that the outcome differs from the Nash outcome. If the reactions curves are increasing,
it is clear from Figure 4 that the outcome implies a lower nominal pay level in both sectors than
what the Nash solution would yield. This implies a higher level of employment as well. Note that
if this interpretation is correct, this benign effect of the wage norm is generated by the bargaining
18procedure whereby one sector has to move ﬁrst. It is not necessary that the follower sector selects
the same wage increase as the leader sector. The mere fact that the leader (T-sector) knows that the
follower will take its decision as given is enough to induce moderation in the behaviour of the leader.
This result can be conﬁrmed algebraically by writing the reaction curve expression of, say, the
S-sector WS = R(WT) into the goods market equilibrium (10). The resulting expression yields the














in which the cross-wage elasticity eWSWT represents the effect of the open sector wage on the fol-
lower’s wage, as internalised by the leading open sector.
Expression (27) should be compared to (16). We see that the strategic complementarity changes:
the leading T-sector has to observe that its ability to increase its own price by boosting its own
wage is impaired by the fact that a higher own sector wage also implies a higher wage for the other
(followersector). Thus, iftheT-sectorleads, itsabilitytoinﬂuenceitsownproductpriceisimpaired.
It internalizes a lower own-price-wage elasticity epTWT than in the Nash case, and consequently sets
a lower wage. The follower S-sector is on its reaction curve, of course and internalizes the own-
wage-price elasticity (15). These results correspond to Figure 4: the T-sector is under its reaction
curve and the S-sector is on its reaction curve. The result is summarised:
Result 2. When s < 1, the outcome of a bargaining procedure in which one sector leads and the
other follows results in lower nominal wages in both sectors and therefore higher employment, as
compared to Nash equilibrium.12.
4.4 The wage norm as a binding relative wage
The third interpretation presented in section 2 was that the leader sector sets a binding norm on
the percentual wage increase. If this norm is accepted by the follower, and the leader understands
that this is the case, the parties implicitly agree on an unchanged relative wage between the sectors.
We argued above that this interpretation comes close to how Swedish labour market organisations
themselves interpret the current bargaining setup: the “norm” is always interpreted as a binding
percentual increase, which is equivalent to implementing an unchanged relative wage.
Let us ﬁrst characterise such outcomes and then come back to how, if at all, they may be sup-
ported procedurally.
Assume now that both cartels accept that the wage ratio WS/WT should be unchanged and that
both understand that the other one accepts this. Suppose also, as in the previous section, that the
T-sector moves ﬁrst. The outcome is now as pictured in Figure 5. The T-sector bargaining cartel
takes as given that the ﬁnal outcome will be on the line that embodies the implicit agreement on an
unchanged relative wage. The slope of that line is of course determined by the pair of initial wages.
12With Cobb-Douglas consumer preferences, s = 1, and the Stackelberg solution obviously coincides with Nash
equilibrium. This case is analysed by Calmfors and Larsson (2009).
19Thus, whatever pay increase the leader chooses, the S-sector cartel will choose exactly the same
increase. As is clear from Figure 5, this setup can induce strong pay moderation. The T-sector can
effectively pick a point from the ray that embodies the ﬁxed relative wage. Barring an extremely
low initial relative wage WS/WT, that line is less steep than the S-sector reaction curve, as depicted
in Figure 5.
In this model, there is a strong result:
Result 3. Assume that the leading T-sector cartel believes that the S-sector will choose a the same
percentual wage increase as the T-sector. The T-sector cartel then chooses the (low) autonomous
wage Wr/d.
The proof is trivial: the T-sector cartel knows that the relative wage WS/WT is given. Hence,
even the relative price pS/pT is given. This implies that even pT is given (because of equation (9)).
Hence, the T-cartel cannot inﬂuence its own price and epTWT =0 must hold in the traded sector wage
decision. This implies that the autonomous wage Wr/d is chosen.
Thus, the S-sector can induce substantial wage moderation in the T-cartel just by credibly com-
mitting itself to some relative wage target. The remarkable thing is that this relative wage target can
be arbitrary, yet the wage moderating effect on the T-sector will still be there. Despite its mathemat-
ical triviality, I believe this result is potentially important for Swedish pay bargaining. Even if the
parties do not agree on a relative wage but the follower sector (sheltered sector) can credibly commit
itself to an unchanged relative wage, the threat has big moderating inﬂuence on the behaviour of the
leader. This may help to rationalise the stubborn insistence of many unions in the Nordic countries
that everybody should get the same percentual increase.
4.5 Envy as a procedural support for a wage norm
The result of the previous section was based on the assumption that the wage increase norm was
binding, which effectively tied down the relative wages of the economy. This took away the leader
sector’s ability to manipulate the relative wage (price), so that the low autonomous wage was chosen.
An immediate question is whether such an outcome or a similar outcome can be procedurally
supported in a reasonable extension of the model at hand.
Fortunately, a recent paper by Calmfors and Larsson (2009) provides tools that enable one to give
a tentative answer to this question. In a related model, they introduce the assumption of an envious
follower. Following the ideas of Kahneman and Tversky, they assume that the perceived utility of an









where the loss aversion parameter ak depends on whether the wage wi (in their notation) exceeds the
“norm” wage, and the norm wage is simply assumed to be the wage of the other union wn:














a1 > 0 if wi ≤ wn
0 if wi > wn.
(29)
Thus, the linear utility of the representative follower union member is, in the case in which the other
sector has a higher wage, discounted with a term that depends on the ratio of the two wages. Using
this setup, Calmfors and Larsson show, in a model that has some similarities with that of this paper,
that there may arise corner solutions in which the envy of the follower indeed disciplines the wage
decision of the leader sector.
We borrow the Calmfors – Larsson idea but generalise it to ﬁt the assumption of the last section.
As is apparent from the last two expressions, Calmfors and Larsson condition the envy-related loss
aversion of the follower sector on whether the follower sector gets the same wage level as the leader.
In my opinion, union leaders are clearly more obsessed with percentual wage increases. It is very
difﬁcult for a union to explicitly agree on a lower wage increase than that obtained by the other
unions. Therefore, we suggest here an alternative speciﬁcation: that loss aversion be associated
with the follower’s lower relative pay increase. This also implies that the equilibrium of the system
becomes dependent on the initial state: some initial wage ratios imply that the envy-related pay norm
is effective, whereas other initial ratios lead to outcomes in which the norm of same pay increases
is not respected. Thus, this setup generates a rudimentary theory of why the norm sometimes binds
and sometimes does not.
Returning to our model, we assumed in equation (1) that the utility of a worker was simply linear
in the wage. Instead, assume now that the utility e WS of a representative member of the follower S-
union is a function of the wage that he/she gets, multiplied by a function of the ratio of the percentual





where Di is the percentual pay increase of sector i. The effective utility e WS now replaces WS in the
deﬁnition of S-sector utility (1). This transforms the preference map of the S-sector, so that a kink in
the indifference curves appears along the “same-increase line”, i.e. along the locus of points at which
the two cartels obtain the same percentual increase. Observe that the slope of that line depends on
the wage ratio WS/WT that is in force before the bargain is initiated. This is illustrated in Figure 6.
The conventional S-sector indifference curves UU′ reﬂecting preferences (1) are now replaced by
the curves EU′ which embody the pain due to the wage increase deviation. As long as the S-sector’s
pay increase is greater or equal to that of the T-sector (i.e. we are to the right of the same-increase
line), the preference map is not affected by the envy factor.
We assume that only the “follower” S-sector suffers from envy.
If the parameter ak is sufﬁciently large, the resulting S-sector reaction curve will consist of the
conventional reaction curve as long as it yields a higher WS than the same-increase line, and of the
same-increase line thereafter. This new reaction curve is drawn in Figure 6 as the thick polyline




















consisting of two segments.13
Recall that the slope of the envy restriction curve is a function of the initial wage at the moment
of wage bargaining. With the help of this extension, we can build a redimentary theory of why the
pay increase norm established by the traded sector sometimes binds and sometimes not.
The preference maps of the cartels obviously depend on productivity. It is reasonable to suppose
that, each year, positive productivity growth plus other shocks like local wage drift and structural
change move the economy to some point where the wages are too low to satisfy the aspirations
of the bargaining cartels. Consider Figure 7. Suppose, for example, that high productivity growth
of the economy plus some negative export shock have moved the economy to the initial point A
where the wage ratio WS/WT is relatively high. The effective reaction curve of the S-sector is now
represented by the thick line. The T-sector can then do no better than choose the point B which is
a corner solution. At this point, both wages will be lower than at the Stackelberg outcome without
envy, which is represented at point C. The economic interpretation is straightforward: the envious
“irresponsibility” of sector S disciplines the wage leader, since the leader understands that above
some wage increase level the follower will always ask for at least a similar increase. Thus, with a
high sheltered sector relative wage to begin with, the norm binds and the sheltered sector follows the
increase of the traded sector.
Consider now another initial wage vector, say, according to point A in diagram 8. Now, the
relative wage WS/WT is low, perhaps because of a transitory export boom that has led to wage drift
13Ifak is low, the upper segment of the reaction curve lies somewhere between the conventional reaction curve without
envy and the same-increase line.
















in the open sector. The outcome is now different. The T-sector understands that the other sector is
anyway highly likely to deviate from the norm with a higher wage increase. Then the T-cartel can
do no better than to choose the most attractive point on that part of S-sector conventional reaction
curve that lies to the right of the same-increase line. The T-sector can in this case not hope to remain
on the same-increase restriction, because the initial wage ratio is so advantageous for the T-sector:
to compel the S-sector to keep that restriction, the T-sector would have to set a very high wage that
would lead to high unemployment.
It is clear that the cutoff point between these two cases corresponds to the initial wage ratio that
is identical to that implied by the Stackelberg solution.
The previous section argued that the leader will choose the low autonomous wage if it is con-
vinced that the follower will always choose the same wage increase. No procedural support was
offered there. Instead, it was simply assumed that a binding norm existed. This section has applied
an idea borrowed from Calmfors and Larsson (2009) to investigate whether envy concerning relative
wage increases can sustain wage moderation. In a setup in which only the follower is envious, the
answer is yes. Yet the outcome depends on the initial wage.
However, note that we haven’t provided a procedural support for precisely that outcome that
was analysed in the previous section and which was deﬁned as an interior solution of the T-sector’s
optimisation problem, when the optimisation is carried out under with the constraint that the relative
wage is unchanged. As is apparent from the arguments of this section, the case in which the same-
24Figure 8 High initial traded sector wage: the same-increase restriction does not bind










increase line constrains the leader is a corner solution.14 15
We summarise these ﬁndings in the following result.
Result 4. If the follower sector feels envy about its relative pay increase, this envy, if intense
enough, can amount to a credible commitment that compels the wage leader to set a lower wage than
the Stackelberg outcome, provided that the initial wage ratio (WS/WT)0 exceeds that implied by the
Stackelberg solution without envy. In this case, the observed outcome will appear to satisfy a wage
bargaining norm of uniform percentual increases. If the initial wage ratio (WS/WT) is lower than that
associated with the Stackelberg solution, the latter will be chosen. The norm of uniform increases
will then not appear to be respected, and, instead, the follower S-sector claims a higher increase.
Thus, whether the norm is respected depends on the initial wage.
4.6 Both sectors envious
We have seen that a binding norm can sustain wage moderation and that something similar can be
procedurally sustained by an envious follower sector. The reason is that envy provides a credible
14It may be noted, though, that if the initial traded sector is wage low enough, the T-wage associated with the corner
solution analysed in this section can be arbitrarily close to the autonomous wage Wr/d. This case is perhaps mostly a
curiosum.
15Larsson and Calmfors derive a similar result, in a model in which the follower’s envy is deﬁned as a function of the
deviation in wage levels. They show that such a setup can not sustain an outcome in which the leader ﬁnds an interior
solution under the constraint that the wage levels are identical. Their model is not identical to ours, however, because
of the different deﬁnition of envy and because they use Cobb-Douglas consumer preferences that imply horizontal and
vertical Nash-Cournot reaction curves.










commitment to a high wage claim that matches the relative increase of the leader. This compels the
leader to a policy of restraint.
Envy about relative pay increases can be more detrimental to employment, however, if both
sectors are envious. If this is the case, the initial relative wage is very important.
Assume now that both cartels are envious and that the envy parameters are so high that none of
the cartels will accept a lower percentual increase than the other cartel. Then, given any initial wage
and high enough envy parameters, both sectors can simultaneously be satisﬁed only with similar
increases so that the relative wage stays put.
The T-sector cartel leads. To ensure that it gets at least the increase that the S-cartel will enforce,
it has to set a wage WT that is so high that the S-cartel has no incentive to choose a higher wage
increase. Consider ﬁgure 9, where we have drawn two possible initial wages at points A and B and
where it is assumed that the Stackelberg outcome without envy is at point S.
Suppose ﬁrst that the initial wage vector is at point A. Then the T-cartel wants to select a wage
that is at least as high as the one that corresponds to point C. If it chooses anything under that, the
no-envy part of the S-cartels reaction curve dictates a higher increase for the S-sector, which the
leader wants to avoid. The T-cartel also understands that the follower cartel will not accept anything
that lies above the same-increase line that goes through point A. Therefore the T-cartel effectively
chooses on the segment of the same-increase line that lies to the right of point C. Point C will then
be chosen. However, that point would be chosen by the T-cartel even if it were not envious. In this
case, with a low initial traded sector wage, the leader’s envy is irrelevant and the follower envy still
constrains the solution towards lower wage and higher employment, when compared to the no-envy
26case.
Suppose instead that the initial wage is at point B. A non-envious leader would have preferred
point S, which also would have satisﬁed the envy restriction of the S-sector. An envious leader,
however, will choose a high wage WT that meets its own envy restriction. In this case, the leader’s
envy alters the outcome towards less wage moderation16. We summarize these results:
Result 5. If both sectors are envious, the outcome depends on the initial wage. When the T-
sector’s initial relative wage is low, the leader’s envy is irrelevant for the outcome which will be
driven by the follower S-sectors envy which improves employment. If the leader’s initial relative
wage is high, the leader’s envy yields an outcome with higher wages and lower employment, as
compared to the case where only the follower in envious. Thus, the leader’s envy, given an envious
follower, is irrelevant at best and harmful at worst.
We consider the case where only the follower is envious as the benchmark one. We have no
stringent motivation for this assumption, but somehow it seems plausible. The leading manufactur-
ing industry sector is the productivity leader, and policymakers have in the Nordic countries always
considered the export industry as crucial for the nation’s economic well-being.17 Note, however,
that the model of this paper is completely symmetric. There is under a ﬂoating exchange rate no
asymmetry that would warrant the one of the sectors should have the privilege to lead.
5 An empirical look at wage bargains
Let us summarize the two most important theoretical predictions of the model.
1. First prediction. The central conclusion of section 4.3 was that sequential bargaining leads to
more wage moderation and higher employment. This was the case in the Stackelberg equilib-
rium, as compared to Nash equilibrium. It was also the case of the binding norm set by the
leader, as analysed in section 4.4. Thus, with the ratiﬁcation of the Industrial Agreement and
the general acceptance of leader–follower bargaining, we should observe lower wage claims.
2. Second prediction. The conclusion of section 4.5 was that the wage claims of the leader as
well as the observed observance of the norm would depend on the initial wage ratio. With a
low traded sector relative wage, we should see more moderate wage claims by that sector and
a better observance of the norm by the follower (this corresponds to point B in Figure 7). By
contrast, if the traded sector initial relative wage is high, we should see a high wage increase
in that sector and an even higher one in the sheltered sector (this corresponds to point B in
Figure 8).
Of course, we do not pretend that these predictions can be tested in a very stringent way. But at
least it can be illuminating to study whether the wage bargaining outcomes during the last 15 years
16It is easy to work out the case where only the leader is envious. With a low initial WT/WS, the leader’s envy does
not affect the Stackelberg outcome; if initial WT/WS is high, the leader’s envy increases both wages relative to the
Stackelberg solution.
17This is also the case considered by Calmfors and Larsson (2009).











1. Bargained industry increase (A) 3.3 2.3 2.4 2.0 2.8
2. Bargained service sector increase (B) 3.6 2.8 2.7 2.1 3.1
3. Service sector bargain surplus (B−A) 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.3
4. Industry increase, outcome (C) 5.5 3.5 3.7 3.1 3.6
5. Service sector increase, outcome (D) 4.6 3.7 3.8 3.1 3.5
6. Service sector outcome surplus (D−C) -0.9 0.2 0.1 0.0 -0.1
7. Service sector mean-corrected surplus -0.7 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1
8. Preceding period industry increase, outcome (E) 3.8 5.5 3.5 3.7 3.1
9. Preceding period service sector increase, outcome (F) 3.4 4.6 3.7 3.8 3.1
10. Preceding period S-surplus (F−E) -0.4 -0.9 0.2 0.1 0.0
11. Preceding period mean-corrected S-surplus -0.2 -0.7 0.4 0.3 0.2
12. Expected productivity growth under bargain (G) 1.3 2.2 2.1 2.6 2.1
13. Productivity growth, outcome (H) 3.1 3.0 3.1 4.3 -1.8
14. Expected bargained industry ULC change (A−G) 2.0 0.1 0.3 -0.6 0.7
15. Unemployment under the bargain 10.6 9.8 5.9 7.7 6.1
16. Theoretical interpretation Nash Stack. corner corner ?
Source: National Institute of Economic Research. The wage increase measures are the ones that are
reported monthly in the Swedish Konjunkturlönestatistiken (“Short Term Salary Statistics”). The ex-
pected productivity growth is deﬁned as the average productivity growth under the ﬁrst and second
year of the upcoming contract period, as anticipated by the National Institute of Economic Research
in its last forecast published under year that preceded the bargain. Thus, for example, for the bar-
gaining round 2001–2003, we take the productivity forecast from the institute’s publication Swedish
Economy from November 2000, concerning years 2001 and 2002, and average them. Productivity
growth forecasts were in general not available for the entire three-year periods and we therefore use
the forecast for the ﬁrst two upcoming years. The productivity growth outcome variable spans the
entire three-year-period, by contrast.
at all match these theoretical predictions.
The 1995 bargaining round was a rather uncoordinated one. Since the Industrial Agreement was
ratiﬁed in 1997, four major bargaining rounds have taken place, inﬂuenced by that agreement. Each
bargaining round culminated in collective wage agreements, ﬁrst for the manufacturing industry and
then for the the service sector and public sector wage setters. The agreements covered a three-year
period, starting with the pay increases in the year of negotiations.
The following table depicts some basic data on these wage settlements. The ﬁrst two lines tell
the collectively agreed pay increase for the manufacturing industry (without construction) and the
collectively agreed pay increase for the service sector, respectively. These sectors are here treated as
proxies for the paper’s T-sector and S-sector.
Line 3 records the surplus of the S-sector, i.e. how much the follower exceeded the norm. Lines
4 through 7 report the outcome of wage increases under each three-year contract period, includ-
ing those, mostly locally agreed, wage increase components that came on top of the collectively
bargained increases. Line 6 records the S-sector surplus in outcome terms.
28In the period 1995–2009 we investigate, the S-sector wage surplus outcome is on average nega-
tive. In other words, these data show an on average higher industry wage increase over the service
sector wage increase, with a difference of about 0.22 per cent per year. This reﬂects the fact that
these statistics do not take into account the changes in the composition of the workforce but only
record the difference in pay increases for the given groups of the base year.18. We therefore correct
the S-surplus ﬁgure by subtracting this difference of means, and this is reported in line 7.
The next four lines contain information on the outcome of the increases during the preceding
contract period. This brings in even the information from the period 1992–1994 that is relevant to
judge the circumstances as to the relative wage during the bargain on 1995. It also makes easier to
judge relative wage movements under the two contract periods that precede the one one wants to
evaluate.
In line 12, we report the expected future productivity growth under the upcoming contract period,
as anticipated at the time when collective negotiations were conducted. These productivity forecasts
are taken from the National Institute’s “Swedish Economy” last report under the year that precedes
the the bargaining.19
Line 13 reports the productivity outcome of the contract period. Line 14 is a crude measure of
“militancy” (inverse moderation): we subtract the anticipated business sector productivity growth
from the collectively bargained T-sector pay increase of line 1. This yields a crude measure of
militancy: how much would unit labour costs in the Swedish business sector have increased, if the
collectively bargained pay increase of the industry would have become the business sector outcome.
A low or negative entry in the last line is thus a token of wage moderation. Line 15 is the ILO
measure of unemployment.
Finally, the last line is a suggested theoretical interpretation of the bargaining outcome according
to the models presented in this paper. Of course, any such interpretation is very speculative.
Out of these data, it is possible to concoct a story that at least does not shout out loudly against
the theoretical model. Consider the ﬁrst two bargains, that of 1995–1997 and that of 1998–2000.
The militancy measure of line 14 shrinks markedly between those two, and this coincides with
the ratiﬁcation of the Industrial Agreement in 1997. This is consistent with our ﬁrst prediction:
moderation improves when no co-ordination gives way to sequential bargaining.
Note that the bargained S-surplus is still fairly high, 0.5, in 1998–2000 and even 0.3 in 2001–
2003 (see line 3). Both of these contract periods were preceded by wage outcomes in which the
traded sector wages had increased more than the sheltered sector ones (see lines 10 and 11). Thus,
during the bargains of 1998 and 2001, we would rather expect to be in the case of high traded sector
initial wage of Figure 8, and this rhymes with the high S-surplus. This is consistent with the second
prediction.
18These numbers are from the Short Term Salary Statistics (Konjunkturlönestatistiken). In the National Accounts,
there is no such systematic tendency of higher industry pay increases. Of course, basic economics suggests that wages
of all sectors should in the long run grow at the same pace.
19This seems reasonable, since the industry typically conducts its bargains from the turn of the year onwards, and
the National Institute’s report is published in December. Thus, for example, the industry’s bargaining round for the
contract period 2004–2006 was conducted from December 2005 to March 2006, and the National Institute’s report with
its productivity growth forecast for the upcoming years was published in December 2005.
29Consider now what happens in the bargain of 2004. In that contract, we see the highest mod-
eration (low militancy), i.e. the lowest bargained unit labour cost increase (see line 14). In the
theoretical model, we saw that T-sector wage moderation would be enhanced by a lower initial
wage for the T-sector. Thus, increased wage moderation is likely to be preceded by S-sector pay
increases that exceed thoses of the T-sector (in Figures 6 through 8, this corresponds to a clockwise
rotation of the same-increase line). This is indeed what we observe during the preceding contract
period 2001–2003: the S-sector has now started to get compensation for the higher traded sector in-
creases that occurred during the earlier contract periods (see lines 10 and 11). This is also consistent
with our second prediction.
Finally, the envy model implied that with an improved S-sector relative wage, high moderation
would be accompanied by an observed high observancy of the norm. This is also what we observe
in 2004: the S-sector bargained surplus measure from line “Service sector bargain surplus” is only
0.1 in 2004–2006. This contrasts with the earlier contract periods 1998–2000 and 2001–2003 when
T-sector bargained increases were higher, simultaneously with a higher service sector bargained
surplus.
Thus, in broad terms, we see increasing moderation and increasing observance of the norm,
once the S-sector starts to catch up. Note that this period of increasing moderation coincides with
decreasing unemployment. If there were no institutional changes going on, one would expect that
lower unemployment would be associated with higher, not lower wage claims in relation to antici-
pated productivity growth.
The interpretation of the last contract period 2007–2009 is perhaps less clear cut. Militancy
increases, as compared to the earlier contract period (see line 14), although the S-surplus continues
to be positive in the preceding period. Note, however that unemployment is now clearly lower than
before, which in itself boosts wage claims. It is also true that an unusually large part of the bargained
increasein2007consistedofminimumpaylevelincreases, whichintheSwedishwagebargainsoften
seem to be an additive extra component, on top of the generally agreed “room” for pay increases.20.
These comparisons were based on comparisons of wage increases according to short term Short
Term Salary Statistics, so that an S-sector surplus could be interpreted as a clockwise rotation of
the same-increase line of Figures 6 through 8. This allowed an interpretation of the data: when
the sheltered sector starts to catch up, moderation increases and the enorm is better observed, as is
exempliﬁed by the bargaining round of 2004.
The envy model implied that the initial level of relative wages, together with S-sector aversion
towards lower wage increases, would determine the economic outcome. In the empirical reasoning
above, we used changes in the relative wage outcomes on lines 10 and 11 as an indication of the
economy moving from the no-corner solution of Figure 8 to the corner solution of Figure 7.
We did not look at relative wage levels, however. It would be reassuring if even an anlysis of
relative wage levels conﬁrmed a similar story. The Business Cycle Wage Statistics do not generate
meaningful levels, however, because they are compiled as averages of pay increases for given groups
20See the National Institute of Economic Research Wage Formation Report 2008 for an analysis of these minimum
pay increases.




















































of white-collar and blue-collar employees in manufacturing industry, construction, services and the
local and central government. They do not take into account any changes in the composition of the
workforce.
The relative wage level between manufacturing industry and the service sector is reported in
the quarterly national accounts, however, and we can use those statistics to check whether we see
a similar pattern. To corroborate the story above – increasing moderation and norm observance
once the sheltered sector improves its position –, we should see a move from a higher manufaturing
industry relative wage in the late 1990’s towards a lower one from the turn of the decade onwards.
Figure 10 reports that this is indeed the case. The industry’s relative wage is higher during the
bargain years of 1995 and 1998, and it is lower in 2001 and 2004 when we see wage moderation and
norm observance increasing. Even the 2007 ﬁgure is under the 1995-1999 level.
31Note also that trade union leaders are more likely to look at the Short Term Salary Statistics
when making their comparisons. The National Accounts ﬁgure is less likely to be weighed in in
their wage claims, since it is less easy to relate to collectively agreed pay increases. The National
Accounts reading incorporates all structural and compositional changes in the labour force, whereas
the Short Term Salary Statistics is far easier to relate to the unions leaders’ target variables. Thus,
even if the Short Term Salary Statistics does not allow for very meaningful level comparisons, it is
likely to be the statistic that the labour market parties will make greater use of.
6 Discussion and conclusions
There is a discussion in Sweden on the merits and drawbacks of the current bargaining regime. Crit-
ics argue that the wage norm regime is inefﬁcient, since it imposes a uniform level of pay increases
on all sectors. Lars Calmfors (2008), for example, has recently argued that this, together with pos-
sible social norms, can lead to employment losses. If demand and employment are high in those
sectors which start a bargaining round, it is hard for the follower unions to settle on a lower pay
increase, even if the conditions of those sectors would warrant this.
The results of this paper suggest that a system of sequential bargaining, possibly combined with
norms on pay increases, can have merits as well. In section 4.3, it was shown that a sequential
bargaining procedure is likely to yield a better employment outcome than a simultaneous Nash-
Cournot game.
That leader – follower games generically yield more efﬁcient outcomes than Nash equilibria is
well known. To understand Nordic and Swedish pay bargaining, the results of section 4.4 and 4.5
may be more interesting and original, despite their mathematical simplicity. If there is a strong norm
among large unions that everybody should get the same increase, a powerful incentive for the wage
leader to claim high wages is removed: there is no cross wage elasticity (price elasticity) exploit.
This insight may make more intelligible the well entrenched attachment of Nordic unions to uniform
pay increases across bargaining units. That attitude is often ridiculed, but the results of this paper
suggest that it may be a pragmatic way of sustaining wage moderation.
In section 4.4, the existence of a norm on relative wage increases was simply assumed. In
section 4.5, we generalised an idea of Calmfors and Larsson to show that the follower’s “envy”
or loss aversion about pay increases could amount to a procedural support for wage moderation,
since that envy created a credible threat that disciplined the wage leader. Whether this outcome
occurs, however, depends on the initial relative wages. This also yields an insight on why the norm
sometimes binds and sometimes not.
Taking as benchmarks the results of the Stackelberg equilibrium without envy as well as the envy
model with an envious follower sector, we investigated the data on wage bargaining outcomes in the
last ﬁve bargaining rounds. We found that these data were consistent with the model predictions.
The establishment of sequential bargaining led to a signiﬁcant reinforcement of wage moderation.
Furthermore, and in accordance with the model, the late 1990’s were associated with a higher traded
sector relative wage, less wage moderation and a weaker observance of the wage norm by the fol-
32lower sector. When the sheltered sector wage caught up, we observed more moderate wage claims
and a better observance of the norm. Although these observations do not amount to any stringent
test, they suggest that the model is compatible with those few observations that we have on Swedish
pay bargaining outcomes.
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